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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the Supreme Court did not afford First Amendment
protection for speech that was strictly commercial in nature.  However, more1
recently, the Court has provided commercial speech a significant level of
protection, recognizing that the free flow of commercial information is
essential to the promotion of a free market because it informs the numerous
private economic decisions that drive the system.  While the Court does not2
apply a “strict scrutiny” First Amendment analysis to restrictions on
commercial speech, it crafted an intermediate test in Central Hudson v. Public
Service Commission of New York, which is now the applicable standard in
evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions.3
The Central Hudson doctrine applies not only to restrictions on
commercial speech that promotes “regular” activities, like advertisements for
computers or supermarkets, but also to commercial speech that promotes so-
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Virginia,
2008.
1. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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called “vice activities,” like consumption of tobacco and alcohol.  This Note4
will focus on the constitutionality of restricting commercial speech concerning
another so-called “vice activity,” legal prostitution. Recently, in Coyote
Publishing v. Miller, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a Nevada statute, which restricted advertising for legal brothels, was
constitutional under the four-pronged Central Hudson test.  This Note will5
begin by tracing the development of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence, with a particular emphasis on the “vice cases.” It will then
proceed to argue that, if the Supreme Court would have granted the plaintiffs’
Petition for Certiorari in Coyote Publishing, the Nevada statute restricting
advertisements for legal brothels would probably have been struck down as a
violation of the First Amendment because it does not satisfy the intermediate
scrutiny of the Central Hudson test.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S COMMERCIAL SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Until 1976, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not protect
speech that was strictly commercial in nature.  The Court defines commercial6
speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”  Protection of commercial speech not only promotes the7
commercial interests of the speaker, but it also serves the best interest of
society by allowing for the “fullest possible dissemination of information.”8
Furthermore, the consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial
information, on a day-to-day basis, is probably more important to that
consumer than the day’s most urgent political debate.  That is, the tangible of9
effects of commercial speech on society, when aggregated, might have an even
greater effect than political discourse. Therefore, it is extremely important to
keep the channels of commercial information open, rather than allow the
government to close them, because “people will perceive their own best
interests only if they are well enough informed.”  Recognizing the importance10
4. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (applying Central Hudson
to tobacco advertisements); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996) (applying Central
Hudson to alcohol advertisements).
5. Coyote Publ., Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 610 (9th Cir. 2010).
6. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 561–62.
9. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 481–82.
10. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (“[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they
are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication,
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of the expression of commercial speech, the Court crafted an intermediate
level of scrutiny in order to evaluate the constitutionality of governmental
commercial speech restrictions.11
In Central Hudson, the Court assessed the constitutionality of an action
made by the Public Service Commission of New York, which banned
promotional advertising for electric utility companies.  The purpose of the12
prohibition was to stem the use of electricity, based on a finding that New
York did not possess sufficient resources to continue furnishing electricity
during the fuel shortage of 1973–74.  Using a newly crafted, four-part13
intermediate scrutiny analysis, the Court struck down the Commission’s
action, holding that it violated both First and Fourteenth Amendment
protections.14
The first prong of the Central Hudson test is probably the simplest of the
four. It involves a determination of whether the advertised activity is both
lawful and truthful.  Because the importance of commercial speech is based15
upon its informational value, the Court held that advertisements do not qualify
for First Amendment protection unless they convey messages that accurately
inform the public about lawful activity.  Thus, the state possesses the power16
to ban commercial speech that is clearly deceptive or speech that promotes
unlawful activity.17
If the commercial speech is neither deceptive nor related to unlawful
activity, the second prong of the Central Hudson test shifts the burden to the
government, which must show a “substantial” state interest that will be
advanced through the speech restriction.  Furthermore, “the regulatory18
technique must be in proportion to that interest.”  In Central Hudson, the19
rather than to close them . . . .”).
11. Id. at 566.
12. Id. at 558–59.
13. Id. at 558 (“The order was based on the Commission’s finding that ‘interconnected utility system
in New York state does not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all
customer demands for the 1973–1974 winter.’”).
14. Id. at 571–72 (“When, however, such action involves the suppression of speech, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the restriction be no more extensive than necessary to serve the state
interest. In this case, the record before us fails to show that the total ban on promotional advertising meets
this requirement.”).
15. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”).
16. Id. at 563.
17. Id. at 563–64.
18. Id. at 564.
19. Id.
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Court held that the state’s interest in conserving energy was undoubtedly
substantial.  This requirement usually does not present a very high hurdle for20
the government, as it can assert almost any regulatory interest related to
furthering the public welfare of the state.  For instance, the Supreme Court21
has held that the interest of the state in preventing minors from using tobacco
is unquestionably “substantial.”  However, the government bears the burden22
of identifying the substantial interest and showing that it is real, not merely
hypothetical.  In fact, the Supreme Court has encountered interests that it did23
not deem “substantial.” In United States v. Playboy Entertainment, Inc., the
government failed to convince the Court that the possibility of children
occasionally and accidentally being exposed to sexually explicit television
programs was a “pervasive, nationwide problem justifying its nationwide
daytime speech ban.”24
If the state’s interest is deemed substantial, then it is necessary to move
on to the third prong of the Central Hudson analysis. Under the third criterion,
the restriction on speech must directly advance the asserted governmental
interest.  That is, any given commercial speech restriction must be shown to25
actually protect the interest advanced by the state. This step of the analysis
involves focusing on the relationship between the state’s interest and the
advertising ban.  If an advertising restriction is challenged, the government26
will bear the burden of showing that the regulation advances the interest “in
a direct and material way.”  The state seeking to uphold the restriction cannot27
satisfy this burden by mere speculation, rather, it must show that the interests
it claims are real and that the restriction will, in fact, further those particular
interests.  Empirical data is not always necessary to satisfy the “directness”28
requirement.  The Court has been willing to accept anecdotal evidence,29
history, consensus, and even “simple common sense” to show that the
20. Id. at 568.
21. Denise S. Balboni, Note, But I Thought This Was Sin City!: Nevada’s Restrictions on
Advertisements for Legal Brothel Services, 7 NEV. L.J. 548, 555 (2007).
22. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564.
23. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (“[A] governmental body
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree” (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
770–71 (1993)).
24. Id. at 822–23.
25. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
26. Id. at 569.
27. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
28. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)).
29. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555 (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
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regulation is sufficiently direct.  The directness requirement prevents the state30
from restricting “commercial speech in the service of other objectives that
could not themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.”31
Whether or not a challenged restriction passes the third criterion from
Central Hudson can be ascertained by the overall rationality of the regulatory
scheme.  For instance, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Supreme Court32
determined that a federal statute, which prohibited beer manufacturers from
placing alcohol content on labels, was unconstitutional.  In this case, the33
asserted governmental interest was the prevention of “strength wars,” in which
beer manufactures would progressively produce their beers higher and higher
in alcohol content in order to attract customers.  The Court held that the34
alcohol content restriction did not directly advance the interest in preventing
“strength wars” because of the overall irrationality of the regulatory scheme.35
The Court deemed the scheme irrational because it failed to prohibit the
display of alcohol content in advertising, which made no rational sense if the
government’s aim was to prevent “strength wars” between competitors.36
Furthermore, the statute seemed to encourage “strength wars” in wine sales,
where the placing of alcohol content on labels was required, rather than
prohibited.  Thus, the Court held that the “directness” test was not satisfied37
because there was little chance the labeling restriction could directly and
materially advance the government’s interest, while other provisions in the
statutory scheme directly counteracted its effects.38
Finally, the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the
speech restriction be no more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted
state interest.  The test for determining whether a restriction passes this test39
is not necessarily whether it uses “the least restrictive means” available, but
rather whether there exists a “reasonable fit” between the legislature’s ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.  Generally, a speech40
30. Id.
31. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
32. Id. at 488.
33. Id. at 490–91.
34. Id. at 488.
35. Id. at 488–89 (“One would think that if the Government sought to suppress strength wars by
prohibiting numerical disclosures of alcohol content, it would also preclude brewers from indicating higher
alcohol beverages by using descriptive terms.”).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 489.
39. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572.
40. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556 (“The last step of the Central Hudson analysis ‘complements’ the
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restriction will be struck down if it is clearly broader than necessary to attain
the stated interest.  The government must show that it carefully crafted the41
restriction, calculating the costs and benefits associated with the burden
imposed on free speech.  In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court42
invalidated a law that prohibited advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars
within 1,000 feet of a school.  In doing so, the Court noted that the43
advertising restrictions, in practice, would constitute nearly a complete ban on
the communication of truthful information by tobacco manufacturers in urban
areas.  The prohibition would prevent advertising in 87% to 91% of the44
greater Boston area.  Thus, the Court held that restriction did not the satisfy45
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test because the government failed to
show that it had narrowly tailored the prohibition to account for the speech
interests involved.
In United States v. Playboy  ¸the Court similarly held that the complete
daytime scrambling of explicit television channels was not the least restrictive
means of advancing the government’s interest.  The government failed to46
show that allowing customers to individually block explicit channels was not
an adequate alternative to the complete daytime ban.  Therefore, in practice,47
when a state seeks to restrict truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, it
must prove the absence of any less costly or less restrictive means.48
third step. . . . We have made it clear that the ‘least restrictive means’ is not the standard; instead, the case
law requires a reasonable ‘fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends
. . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.’”).
41. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497–98 (On the basis of these principles, “our early cases uniformly
struck down several broadly based bans on truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, each of which
served ends unrelated to consumer protection.”).
42. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561.
43. Id. at 566.
44. Id. at 562.
45. Id.
46. Playboy Entm’t Group, 559 U.S. at 822–23.
47. Id. (holding that “[t]here is no evidence that a well-promoted voluntary blocking provision
would not be capable at least of informing parents about signal bleed (if they are not yet aware of it) and
about their rights to have the bleed blocked (if they consider it a problem and have not yet controlled it
themselves).”).
48. Balboni, supra note 21, at 557.
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III. THERE IS NO LONGER A “VICE EXCEPTION” TO THE PROTECTION OF
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
While it is clear that the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test applies
to all truthful and non-misleading speech concerning lawful activity, it has not
always been clear whether such scrutiny applies when the commercial speech
concerns a lawful “vice activity,” which the state has the power to prohibit
entirely. In this Note, a “vice activity” refers an activity that is generally
disfavored by social and cultural mores, but is nevertheless a legal activity.
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., at issue was a law that
prohibited casinos from advertising to residents of Puerto Rico.  In 1948,49
Puerto Rico legalized casino gambling.  However, in an effort to avoid the50
ills of casino gambling and reap only the rewards, Puerto Rico did not permit
casino advertising that was likely to reach its own residents.  The Court51
proceeded through the Central Hudson analysis with more deference towards
the legislature than in cases that did not involve so-called “vice activities.”52
In cases where commercial speech does not concern a “vice activity,” the
interest of the state is not in preventing that activity itself, but in some other
interest that relates to the regulated activity.  For example, in Central53
Hudson, the ban on advertising for electric companies was not aimed at
preventing the use of electricity in general, but rather to curb expanded usage
of electricity during a historic power shortage.  However, in Posadas, the54
substantial state interest was “the reduction of demand for casino gambling by
the residents of Puerto Rico.”  That is, the substantial state interest was in55
preventing the very activity that was to be advertised. Ultimately, the Posadas
Court held that Puerto Rico’s “greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily included the lesser power to ban the advertising of
casino gambling.”  With the holding in Posadas, it seemed that the Court had56
carved out a “vice exception” to Central Hudson’s protection of commercial
speech. That is, if a state has the power to completely ban a “vice activity,”
49. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 330 (1986).
50. Id. at 331.
51. Id. at 332.
52. Id. at 340.
53. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (holding that energy conservation is a substantial state
interest).
54. Id. at 558.
55. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
56. Id. at 345–46.
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then it necessarily has the “less intrusive” power to ban its advertising, even
if the state has decided to make the activity lawful.
Lasting for almost ten years, this approach justified more extreme
limitations on advertising for “vice activities” because state legislatures were
understood to have legitimate and substantial interests in preventing access to
lawful “vice activities” and products.  However, this approach was later57
abandoned by the Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island.  In 4458
Liquormart, a Rhode Island statute completely prohibited liquor
manufacturers and vendors from advertising retail prices for alcohol “in any
manner whatsoever,” apart from in-store price tags.  Rhode Island’s goal in59
banning advertisements for alcohol was to promote temperance by preventing
retailers from price competition, and thus raising the price of alcoholic
beverages.  The Court invalidated the law and abandoned the “greater power60
includes the lesser power” doctrine from Posadas.  In doing so, the Court61
explained that it failed to see how the state’s power to completely ban a
commercial activity is greater than its power to ban truthful non-misleading
commercial speech.  Contrarily, the Court held that banning speech may62
sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning actual conduct.  The Court63
noted that text of the First Amendment itself makes it clear that the
Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous
than attempts to regulate conduct.  This presumption stems from the vital role64
that the free flow of information plays in a democratic society.  Therefore,65
the Court held that the “greater power” of the state to ban the sale of liquor
entirely did not necessarily entail an ability to censor truthful, non-misleading
advertisements concerning its sale.66
57. Balboni, supra note 21, at 552.
58. 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 508.
59. Id. at 489.
60. Id. at 492.
61. Id. at 511 (“Further considerations persuades use that the ‘greater includes the lesser’ argument
should be rejected for the additional and more important reason that it is inconsistent with both logic and
well-settled doctrine . . . . Although we do not dispute the proposition that greater powers include lesser
ones, we fail to see how that syllogism requires the conclusion that the State’s power to regulate commercial
activity is ‘greater’ than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading, speech.”).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 512 (noting that “the First Amendment directs that government may not suppress speech
as easily as it may suppress conduct and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply another means
that government may use to achieve its ends”).
65. Id.
66. 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 513–14.
2012] COMMERCIAL SPEECH RESTRICTION 229
Furthermore, the Court rejected wholesale Puerto Rico’s contention in
Posadas that any type of “vice exception” should exist to the Central Hudson
analysis.  First, the Court’s holding in Rubin v. Coors made clear that the67
Court had departed from its flawed reasoning in Posadas.  Second, the Court68
noted that the scope of any type of “vice exception,” if it were to exist, would
be practically impossible define.  Any “vice exception” would have also the69
effect of allowing legislatures to justify censorship by simply placing the label
of “vice” on any activity it wishes to regulate.  Finally, it would force the70
courts to develop a federal common law defining the scope of what “vice”
actually entails.71
In 44 Liquormart, having abandoned the “greater power includes the
lesser” doctrine, the Court applied the traditional Central Hudson analysis to
the Rhode Island advertising restriction.  The state argued that its advertising72
prohibition satisfied the Central Hudson test because it directly advanced the
state’s substantial interest in reducing alcohol consumption and because it was
no more extensive than necessary.  First, the Court held that the prohibition73
did not satisfy the “directness” requirement because the state failed to prove,
beyond mere speculation, that the speech restriction would significantly
reduce statewide alcohol consumption.  Second, the court held that it would74
be impossible for the speech restriction to pass the “least restrictive means”
prong of the Central Hudson test.  This is because, where the government has75
the power to directly regulate an activity, any type of speech prohibition will
be more restrictive than necessary.  For instance, it would clearly be less76
restrictive if the state were to simply set baseline prices for liquor, or limit the
amount that an individual could purchase.  This would accomplish the same77
67. Id. (“Our decision last Term striking down an alcohol-related advertising restriction effectively
rejected the very contention respondents now make.”).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 514 (“Almost any product that poses some threat to public health or public morals might
reasonably be characterized by a state legislature as a ‘vice activity.’ Such characterization, however, is
anomalous when applied to products such as alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing cards, that
might lawfully be purchased on the open market.”).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 504.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 507.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 507 (“As the State’s own expert conceded, higher prices can be
maintained either by direct regulation or by increased taxation. . . . Per capita purchases could be limited
as is the case with prescription drugs. Even educational campaigns focused on the problems of excessive,
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goal, that of promoting temperance, but would not offend the First
Amendment. Thus, 44 Liquormart solidified the Supreme Court’s stance
against any kind of “vice exception” to the intermediate scrutiny of Central
Hudson.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN COYOTE PUBLISHING, INC. V. MILLER
In Coyote Publishing, Inc. v. Miller, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a Nevada statute that
restricted advertising pertaining to legal brothels.  Nevada is the only state78
that allows for legal prostitution, giving each county within the state the
option of allowing legal brothels to operate.  Currently, eleven of Nevada’s79
seventeen counties permit the operation of legal brothels.  Though,80
interestingly enough, Nevada’s largest city, Las Vegas, does not allow legal
prostitution because the enabling statute prohibits the operation of legal
brothels in counties with populations exceeding 400,000 people.  Though the81
state legislature chose to legalize prostitution in select counties, it
simultaneously placed severe restrictions on advertising regarding the
activity.  Nevada Revised Statute § 201.430 prohibits any person acting on82
behalf of a legal brothel from advertising “in any public theatre, public street,
or highway” or to include in “any display, handbill or publication [the]
address, location or telephone number of a house of prostitution or of
identification of a means of transportation to such a house.”  Furthermore,83
or even moderate, drinking might prove to be more effective.”).
78. Coyote Publishing Inc., 598 F.3d at 611.
79. Balboni, supra note 21, at 558.
80. Id.
81. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 596.
82. Balboni, supra note 21, at 558.
83. The statute provides:
1. It is unlawful for any person engaged in conduct which is unlawful pursuant to paragraph (b) of
subsection 1 of NRS 207.030, or any owner, operator, agent or employee of a house of prostitution,
or anyone acting on behalf of any such person, to advertise the unlawful conduct or any house of
prostitution:
(a) In any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, or on any public highway; or
(b) In any county, city or town where prostitution is prohibited by local ordinance or where the
licensing of a house of prostitution is prohibited by state statute.
2. It is unlawful for any person knowingly to prepare or print an advertisement concerning a house
of prostitution not licensed for that purpose pursuant to NRS 244.345, or conduct which is unlawful
pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 of NRS 207.030, in any county, city or town where
prostitution is prohibited by local ordinance or where the licensing of a house of prostitution is
prohibited by state statute.
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Nevada Revised Statute § 201.440 provides criminal penalties up of to six
months of imprisonment and up to $1,000 in fines for violating the advertising
prohibition.  The petitioners, several local newspaper publishers, brought a84
facial challenge to the constitutionality of both of these statutory provisions.85
Applying the four-pronged Central Hudson test, the district court held that the
state “failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the provisions
containing the prohibition of advertising for legal brothels on streets,
highways and theatres throughout the State of Nevada is narrowly tailored to
effectuate a substantial governmental interest.”  The respondents then86
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the statute clearly placed a
restriction on commercial speech and correctly chose to employ the familiar
Central Hudson analysis.  Nevada did not assert that the advertising of87
prostitution was false, deceptive, or misleading, so the first prong of the
Central Hudson test was easily satisfied.  In regards to the legality of the88
activity, the court entertained Nevada’s argument that prostitution was
unlawful, at least in counties that prohibited it, but found that the activity was
lawful at the state level.  Thus, finding that the statute restricted truthful, non-89
misleading speech about a lawful activity, the court moved onto step two of
the analysis.90
First, the court identified Nevada’s substantial interest in restricting
advertising for legal brothels as “limiting the commodification of sex.”  The91
state had actually asserted that its substantial interest was “not allowing
minors to learn of the existence of legal brothels.”  However, the court gave92
3. Inclusion in any display, handbill or publication of the address, location or telephone number of
a house of prostitution or of identification of a means of transportation to such a house, or of
directions telling how to obtain any such information, constitutes prima facie evidence of
advertising for the purposes of this section. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.430 (2011).
84. NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.440 (2011).
85. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 597.
86. Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Heller, No. CV06-329JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 3,
2007), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010).
87. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 599.
88. Id. at 606.
89. Id. at 607 (“It is consistent with fundamental precepts of our federal system that the law of
jurisdiction where the transaction is proposed should govern the legality of those transactions, as citizens
of one state ordinarily are free to travel to another state and have their behavior governed by the law of that
second state.”).
90. Id. at 608.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 602 n.14 (“We do not understand Nevada’s argument to be so narrow. Nevada’s opening
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this a broad reading and held that “the state’s concern over sex commodifying
advertisements goes beyond children to encompass society in general.”93
Applying the “directness” test to the asserted state interest against
commodification of sex, the court held that the speech restriction directly and
materially advanced the state’s interest by (1) limiting advertisements that are
in themselves an aspect of the commodifying of sex; and (2) by reducing the
market demand for, and thus the incidence of, the exchange of sex acts for
money.94
Finally, the court held that the speech restriction satisfied the least
restrictive, “reasonable fit” prong of the Central Hudson analysis because
“Nevada strikes a balance between its interest in maintaining economically
viable, legal, regulated brothels and its interest in severely limiting the
commodification of sex.”  Thus, because the court found that the advertising95
restriction satisfied the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test, the Nevada
statute prohibiting advertisements for legal brothels was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit.96
V. THE HOLDING IN COYOTE PUBLISHING FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY
THE CENTRAL HUDSON ANALYSIS
The Plaintiffs filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on October 25,
2010. However, the Petition was denied.  If the Supreme Court granted the97
Petition, it is likely that the decision would have been reversed, and the
restrictive statute would have been struck down as a violation of the First
Amendment. In Coyote Publishing, the court incorrectly interprets the ruling
from 44 Liquormart and grants entirely too much deference to the legislature
in restricting speech regarding legal prostitution. In its opinion, the Ninth
Circuit expressly recognizes that there is no general “vice exception” to the
protections accorded to commercial speech, however, it nevertheless goes on
to create a new exception for commercial speech promoting houses of legal
brief explains that the advertising restrictions serve to ‘limit prostitution’s profile in society.’ Thus although
Nevada does not argue in particular that children should not be exposed to prostitution advertisements, the
state’s concern over sex commodifying advertisements goes beyond children to encompass society in
general.”).
93. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 602 n.4.
94. Id. at 608.
95. Id. at 610.
96. Id. at 611.
97. Coyote Publ’g., Inc. v. Masto, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011), denying cert. to sub nom. Coyote Publ’g.,
Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010).
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prostitution.  Even though it expressly denies doing so, the Ninth Circuit98
inexplicably resurrects the overruled holding from Posadas.
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea of a “vice exception”
to the Central Hudson analysis on at least three occasions since the Posadas
decision.  Even so, the Ninth Circuit goes on to create a specific exception for99
legal prostitution because of the particular evils with which it opines
prostitution is associated.  The social condemnation of prostitution, the court100
reasons, is vastly more widespread than for other categories of “vice” that
courts have considered and that this “may be relevant to the degree of scrutiny
applicable to these advertising restrictions.”  This is precisely the type of101
reasoning that the Supreme Court sought to prevent with its holding in 44
Liquormart. Almost any product that poses some threat to public health or
morals could be characterized by the state legislature as a “vice activity,”
allowing legislatures to censor any advertising by simply placing a “vice”
label on the activity.  One can imagine a variety products or scenarios where102
the legislature could use a “vice exception” to justify its censorship. For
example, a legislature could justify a ban on advertising for ice hockey or
football games, labeling them “vice activities” because these sports often
involve gambling and head injuries.
Subsequent to 44 Liquormart, in Lorillard, the Court reinforced its stance
that no exception to the Central Hudson analysis should be granted simply
because of the unique nature of a certain underlying activity, holding that “to
uphold the Massachusetts tobacco regulations would be to accept a line of
reasoning that would permit restrictions on advertising for a host of other
products.”  Thus, the Coyote Publishing court should not have granted the103
state legislature more deference simply because prostitution might be more
widely condemned than other “vices” like alcohol consumption and casino
gambling.
98. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 600.
99. 44 Liquormart, I517 U.S. at 511–12 (alcohol); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 195 (1999) (casino gaming); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566 (tobacco advertising).
100. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 600 (“We agree that there are strong reasons why the sale of
sexual services, in particular, ought to be treated differently than other advertising bans on ‘vice’
activities.”).
101. Id. at 601.
102. 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 514.
103. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 586–87 (responding to the state’s argument that “tobacco is in some sense
sui generis—that it is so special, so unlike any other object of regulation, that application of normal First
Amendment principles should be suspended”).
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By creating a sui generis exception to Central Hudson for legal
prostitution, the Ninth Circuit is attempting to place a value judgment on a
certain type of commercial speech. On several occasions, the Supreme Court
has rejected the idea that, in determining the constitutionality of a speech
restriction, a court should consider the relative costs and benefits of a certain
type of speech.  Most recently, in United States v. Stevens, the Court went104
so far as to strike down a speech restriction that prohibited the sale or
possession of media depicting cruelty to animals.  Though the state105
obviously had a substantial interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the
statute was overly broad because it extended to other works of art and material
that depicted hunting.  In coming to this conclusion, the Court emphasized106
the danger of making value judgments when determining if a certain speech
is protected under the First Amendment.  The Court described such a system107
for First Amendment analysis as both “startling and dangerous” and held
further that “[o]ur Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment
simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”  Though this case did108
not involve commercial speech, its underlying principles are similarly
applicable to the case at hand because the Ninth Circuit engages in precisely
the type of cost/benefit analysis dismissed by the Supreme Court.
In fact, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Coyote Publishing runs contrary
to these well-established First Amendment principles. Moreover, the court
contradicts itself many times over. It continually engages in the type of
balancing exercise that was rejected by the Stevens court. For instance, the
court quotes a passage from the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, which held that
“[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price . . . to this end the free flow
of commercial information is indispensable.”  Nevertheless, the court109
immediately goes on to state that “[w]hen the underlying service is of
extremely little value, as demonstrated by near consensus within our society,
104. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010); Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n,
Inc., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
105. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1585.
108. Id.
109. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 601 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
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the need for its efficient allocation and distribution is less compelling.”  The110
Ninth Circuit first quotes a Supreme Court passage, which essentially holds
that all commercial speech may be similarly valuable to society. However, it
then argues that prostitution is of extremely little value, and thus its
advertisements deserve less protection than for other activities. The Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and its First Amendment
analysis as it pertains to legal brothels are at complete odds with one another.
Moreover, the court frequently places value judgments on the underlying
activity, which should not enter into the First Amendment analysis.
To be fair, the Stevens Court also recognized that certain categories of
speech may well deserve less protection than others.  The Court noted its111
decision in New York v. Ferber, in which it held that child pornography is
categorically unprotected under the First Amendment.  However, in the case112
of child pornography, the Court did not engage solely in any type of simple
cost-benefit analysis to determine that child pornography was not protected.113
Rather, the court emphasized that the underlying act (child abuse), was illegal
in every jurisdiction in the United States.  The court noted that “[i]t rarely114
has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct
in violation of a valid criminal statute.”  In the case of legal brothels, while115
the advertising may represent an integral part of the underlying act, the
underlying act is not illegal. Therefore, at least in Nevada, advertising for
legal brothels cannot simply be labeled as a type of speech that is categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit attempts to veil its obvious moral disfavor for legal
prostitution by using economic arguments to explain why a sui generis
exception for legal brothels should exist.  It argues that one of the major116
policies behind the protection of commercial speech is the concern for the
distortion of competitive economic markets.  This is because commercial117
110. Id.
111. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585–86.
112. Id. at 1586.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 601 (“The nature of the market in sexual services, such as it is,
provides an additional reason why the goal of efficiency applies with less force. In light of prevailing sexual
mores, a highly transparent, and thus efficient, market for sex is a chimera. In this respect, sex is not a
commodity.”).
117. Id.
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speech restrictions “tend to mitigate competition and maintain prices at a
higher level than would prevail in a completely free market.”  The court then118
goes on to compare the market competition involved for legal brothels with
that of the competition between electric companies in Central Hudson,
concluding that, in the “context of the legal sale of sexual acts . . . there is
relatively little market competition to distort.”  However, Central Hudson119
and its progeny have never made a distinction that resulted in increased
deference to the legislature based simply on the size of an affected market.
Moreover, the court provides no evidence to bolster its assumption that
there is “relatively little market competition” in the legal brothel market. The
decision in Central Hudson actually affected fewer corporate entities than
does the Nevada commercial speech restriction, because only one electric
company was operating in New York at the time.  The Court even went so120
far as to specifically hold that “[e]ven in monopoly markets, the suppression
of advertising reduces the information available for consumer decisions and
thereby defeats the purpose of the First Amendment.”  Thus, the Supreme121
Court emphasizes the ability to disseminate truthful information, not the
potential size or distortion of a given market. Consequently, this argument is
not a justification for providing less First Amendment protection to a certain
type of commercial speech. Furthermore, the decision in 44 Liquormart held
expressly that Central Hudson First Amendment protection extends equally
to all truthful speech about lawful activities.122
The court attempts to use this “lack of market distortion” concept as a
way to lessen the protection afforded to advertising for legal brothels. That is,
it contends that legal brothels deserve less First Amendment protection
because prohibiting advertisements does not have a large effect on the market
for legal prostitution.  However, the Ninth Circuit misinterprets the Supreme123
Court’s market distortion analysis. This concept has been more commonly
used by the Court as a hurdle that the state must overcome in showing that it
118. Id. (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 502).
119. Id.
120. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
121. Id. at 567.
122. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The commercial marketplace,
like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.
Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker
and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented. Thus, even a
communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the
First Amendment.”).
123. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 601.
2012] COMMERCIAL SPEECH RESTRICTION 237
has satisfied the “least restrictive means” criterion of the Central Hudson
analysis, rather than as a mechanism for diminishing the importance of a
certain type of advertising before even beginning the analysis.124
For instance, in 44 Liquormart, the Court held that the ban on advertising
the price of liquor did not satisfy the final criterion because there was not a
reasonable fit between the intended market effect and the means of preventing
alcohol consumption employed by the state.  Here, the state argued that its125
goal in prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices was to promote
temperance by preventing competition and keeping prices higher.  However,126
the state conceded that such a goal could have been more easily accomplished
by other types of market manipulation, such as direct regulation or taxation.127
Thus, the market distortion analysis has been used by the Supreme Court to
assure a reasonable fit between the asserted state interest and the means
employed to further that interest. However, the Ninth Circuit uses the concept
to diminish the value of protecting a certain type of commercial speech, before
even beginning the Central Hudson analysis.
Having established that no diminished scrutiny should apply because of
legal prostitution’s status as a “vice activity,” it is now necessary to apply the
standard Central Hudson four part analysis to the instant case. It soon
becomes clear, that without the increased deference that the Ninth Circuit
granted the Nevada legislature, the restrictive statute violates the Central
Hudson test. First, though Nevada initially makes an argument that
prostitution is illegal in certain counties, the court assumes that it is a lawful
activity for purposes of argument. Presuming that the advertisements are also
truthful, Central Hudson criterion number one falls in favor of the petitioners,
and the burden is now shifted to the state to show that the statute directly
advances a substantial state interest.
However, Nevada fails to meet the state’s burden for the second prong of
the Central Hudson analysis. It does not establish a substantial state interest.
The first mistake made by the Ninth Circuit in its analysis was in creating a
substantial interest not actually advanced by the state. The government bears
the burden of showing a substantial interest and showing that is real, not
hypothetical.  Here, Nevada advanced the interest of “not allowing minors128
124. See 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 529; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 484.
125. 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 507.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817.
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to learn of the existence of legal brothels.”  This approach to justifying129
commercial speech bans has already been expressly disavowed by the
Supreme Court.  Lorillard made it clear that restrictive bans meant to protect130
only minors are overbroad if they also infringe too broadly upon advertising
directed at adults.  In the instant case, the Nevada statute imposes a near131
complete ban on advertising for legal brothels, which by definition are
available only to adults over the age of 18. Thus, the holding runs contrary to
Lorillard in that even if “not allowing minors to learn of the existence of legal
brothels” is a substantial state interest, the statute is overly broad because it
prevents all adults from receiving almost any truthful information regarding
legal brothels.
In order to evade the fairly direct holding of Lorillard, the Ninth Circuit
takes the liberty of extending Nevada’s substantial interest more generally to
“preventing the commodification of sex.”  In doing so, the Court advances132
a fairly incoherent explanation as to why this interest is substantial. The court
begins its justification by stating, rather vaguely, that there is a deeply rooted
American tradition that “[t]here are, in a civilized society, some things that
money cannot buy.”  It goes on to list examples, such as the Thirteenth133
Amendment, which outlawed slavery, as well as laws against receiving
payment for adoptions and the sale of human organs.  One must judge for134
himself or herself, whether these are sufficient justifications for deeming that
the prevention of the “commodification of sex” is a substantial state interest.
Regardless, it was improper for the court to create a substantial interest that
was not advanced by the state because, under Central Hudson, the state bears
the burden of showing that the interest is substantial.135
Even if preventing the “commodification of sex” is considered a
substantial state interest, the Nevada statute still fails the third prong of the
Central Hudson test, that the speech restriction directly advance the
129. Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 602 n.14.
130. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564–65.
131. Id. (“The State’s interest in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and even compelling,
but it is no less true that the sale and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity. We must consider
that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying truthful information about their
products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving truthful information about tobacco
products. In a case involving indecent speech on the Internet we explained that ‘the governmental interest
in protecting children from harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of
speech addressed to adults.’”).
132. See Coyote Publishing, 598 F.3d at 602 n.14.
133. Id. at 603 (quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988)).
134. Id.
135. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817.
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substantial interest, and there exists a reasonable fit between the advancement
of the interest and the means chosen to advance that interest.  As in Rubin,136
the entire regulatory scheme suffers from irrationality.  It seems irrational to137
regulate and license legal brothels, yet still purport to have a substantial
interest in preventing the commodification of sex. A legislature cannot create
a scheme for the regulated sale of sex and simultaneously claim to advance a
substantial interest in preventing such commodification. This is precisely the
same problem the Court found with the alcohol content labeling ban in Rubin.
Within the same statutory scheme, Nevada both licenses houses of prostitution
and prohibits their advertisement almost completely. The statute that allows
the licensing of legal brothels directly counteracts the aim of the statute, which
bans their advertisement almost completely. As in Rubin, the Nevada
restriction fails the “directness” test because of its inherent irrationality.138
Furthermore, the state failed to show beyond “mere speculation” that the
restriction would, in fact, prevent further commodification of sex.  Thus, the139
third prong of Central Hudson is not satisfied.
Finally, the Nevada statute also fails the “least restrictive means” test
from Central Hudson. Here, as in Lorillard, the restriction constitutes almost
a complete ban on advertising for legal brothels and should therefore be
reviewed with careful scrutiny to ensure that the ban is not more restrictive
than necessary.  The government must prove the absence of any means less140
restrictive to the exercise of free speech.  Here, as in 44 Liquormart, there141
are clearly means less restrictive on free speech that would serve the same
substantial state interest.  Thus, it is impossible for the restriction to pass the142
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. Where a legislature has the power to
directly regulate an activity, any regulation on speech concerning that activity
will always be more restrictive than necessary.  Therefore, the Nevada ban143
136. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556.
137. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488 (holding that the “[I]rrationality of this unique and puzzling regulatory
framework ensures that the labeling ban will fail to achieve that end. There is little chance that § 205(e)(2)
can directly and materially advance its aim, while other provisions of the same Act directly undermine and
counteract its effects.”).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 487.
140. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556 (“In some geographical areas, these regulations would constitute
nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information about smokeless tobacco and cigars
to adult consumers. The breadth and scope of the regulations, and the process by which the Attorney
General adopted the regulations, do not demonstrate a careful calculation of the speech interests involved.”).
141. Id. at 561.
142. 44 Liquormart, 512 U.S. at 507.
143. Id.
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on advertising for legal brothels is unconstitutional under the Central Hudson
test.
If Nevada is truly interested in preventing the further commodification of
sex, then it could follow the forty-nine other states in completely outlawing
prostitution. Unless Nevada chooses to use its direct regulatory power to
prohibit prostitution, it cannot constitutionally restrict truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech concerning what is currently a lawful activity within the
state
VI. CONCLUSION
Nevada has chosen to engage in an experiment. In an attempt to cure the
ills of illegal prostitution, it has set up a system for licensing legal brothels. In
theory, this would help to eliminate the illegal and inherently dangerous
underworld of prostitution within Nevada and prevent the abuse of women
who choose to enter the profession. If all potential customers chose to use
legal brothels, then the state would be able to effectively regulate the industry.
However, this system cannot be fully realized unless it is allowed to operate
and advertise consistently with other competitive businesses in the state. In
order for a market to operate freely and efficiently, consumers must be fully
and fairly informed of their options in order to make logical choices. In the
case of prostitution, a customer might choose the services of an illegal
unlicensed prostitute over that of a legal brothel because he is not well enough
informed. This perpetuates the abusive system of illegal prostitution, as well
as exposing the potential customer to the many inherent dangers of entering
the criminal realm. If properly informed by commercial advertisements, all
potential customers might choose to employ the services of legal brothels, and
Nevada’s statutory scheme could be effectively operated. Under the current
system, this is not, and cannot be the case.
The Supreme Court certainly did not have legal prostitution in mind when
it made its seminal decision in Central Hudson. However, the same principles
apply. Truthful speech about lawful activities is afforded intermediate
protection under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
failed to correctly apply this level of scrutiny. Though the plaintiffs’ Petition
for Certiorari was recently denied by the Supreme Court on February 22,
2011, Central Hudson and its progeny indicate that the Court would have
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reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that the Nevada ban on
advertising for legal brothels is invalid on its face.144
144. Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Masto, 131 S. Ct. 1556, 1556 (2001).
